"Not a Happy New Year: The Fire Catastrophe in Volendam"

Gunnar Kuepper, CEM,
Chief of Operations, Emergency & Disaster Management, Inc.

The year 2001 was approximately 30 minutes young when a fire broke out in the café "Little Heaven" in Volendam, The Netherlands. Between 500 and 700 teenagers were enjoying and celebrating the New Year inside the three-story building. Within minutes, flames consumed the combustible Christmas decorations and other interior materials and set people on fire. Terrified youngsters panicked and tried to flee the inferno through the windows on the third floor.

Volendam is a picturesque fishing village about 20 miles northeast of Amsterdam. The small harbor town of 18,000 residents was suddenly confronted with eight young people dead or dying, all of them aged between 16 and 22, and with more than 150 injured, 70 in very serious or critical condition.

Some people were injured while trampling each other and by jumping out of smashed windows. Many sustained lung damage as a result of inhaling extremely hot air and toxic smoke. In addition, numerous teenagers suffered life-threatening burns on up to 80% of their bodies.

Is your community prepared for such a scenario?

Catastrophic fires in dance halls and bars are more frequent than you might think. A few days earlier, on Dec. 25, 2000, a fire in a dance hall in the city of Luoyang in Central China killed at least 309 people and injured dozens of others. On Oct. 20, 2000, a blaze in one of Mexico City’s most popular nightclubs killed at least 20 people and injured 27 others.

Some of you might also remember the catastrophic fire at the Coconut Grove nightclub in Boston in November 1942 that killed 491 people; the blaze at the Beverly Hills Supper Club in Southgate, Kentucky in May 1977, in which 167 people died and 130 others sustained injuries; the conflagration at the illegal Happy Land Social Club in New York City in March 1990, that killed 87 people; or the fire at a night club in Quezon City, Philippines in March 1996, in which more than 150 people died.

In addition to their frequency, these calamities often occur in smaller towns with limited fire, EMS and hospital resources.

On Oct. 28, 1998, a fire in a crowded dance hall in Gothenburg, Sweden killed 63 people ranging in age from 13 to 20 years. One hundred eighty other young people were injured. The Gothenburg region, with 650,000 inhabitants, runs a fire department with 18 stations. But the number of ambulances available and used by the fire brigade was limited to 15.

Forty-five of the approximately 100 hospitalized patients were transported via EMS over a period of two hours. Because of the overwhelming number of injured people, there were cases in which six or seven patients were transported at one time in a single ambulance. Some were forced to take turns breathing through the one-and-only oxygen mask aboard while enroute to one of the three available hospitals. Others were carried by taxicabs or aboard the three municipal buses, at the request of the fire department.

As in the Gothenburg incident, Volendam’s fire brigade and their mutual aid companies were quickly able to extinguish the moderate fire. But again, medical care for more than 150 injured people became a tremendous challenge to the small town. At the Little Heaven café, more than 100 ambulance crews were needed to provide advanced life support (ALS) and transport victims to proper medical facilities. Many of the severely injured needed critical care in highly specialized burn centers. The number of these beds in any single region is limited, therefore, more than 20 people had to be transported to existing units in Belgium and Germany, some 100 miles away.

One hundred EMS units might not be a major problem in large metropolitan areas, and this figure exceeds the number of obtainable ambulances in many, perhaps most, U.S. cities, particularly at night and during the weekends. Even if these resources are on hand, communication and coordination of numerous ambulances from different departments using a myriad of radio frequencies, different SOPs and incompatible equipment can quickly become a nightmare.

In that regard, the Volendam incident was fortunate. It took rescuers a few minutes to arrive, but the nearby metropolitan area of Amsterdam was able to provide a large quantity of ambulances, mass casualty units, EMS supervisors, triage, treatment and radio equipment.

In addition, EMS in The Netherlands is organized on regional levels; all EMS units and ambulances in one region belong to the same jurisdiction and retain clear lines of communication and command. This in turn allows management of all resources and adequate distribution of patients to the proper medical centers and hospitals.

Restaurants, dance halls and similar businesses have proven to be prone to fires with catastrophic outcomes. Often the fire is not the main issue; it is rather the heat and toxic smoke combined with limited or no means of evacuation that creates a deadly trap and causes a disastrous mass casualty incident.

Check Your Local Ordinances

To begin mitigating these catastrophic outcomes, emergency management agencies must ascertain whether or not their local ordinances provide for the following:

n Do they cover proper fire protection, i.e., sprinkler systems, smoke ventilation, fire retardant materials, enough recognizable emergency exits? The Mexico City nightclub that burned in October 2000 had the capacity to hold more than 1,000 people in 4,700 square feet, but had no emergency exit.

n Do they require employee training for fire awareness and evacuation procedures? The Mexico City nightclub survivors testified that disco personnel, who insisted they pay their bills first, blocked them from leaving the burning building. At the 1977 Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, the restaurant staff thought they would be able to contain the fire. Not wanting to disturb their estimated 1,300 patrons, servers sought authority from management before warning and evacuating the guests.

n Do your local ordinances call for a fire warden to be present at all times?

n Who enforces these fire codes, particularly at night or during weekends, when all restaurants and bars are in full operating mode? In the 1942 Coconut Grove fire, the city of Boston had licensed the club facility for up to 500 people, but an estimated crowd of 1,000 people was inside when the blaze started. In the 1998 Gothenburg tragedy, approximately 400 people attended the party, though the fire department had established – prior to the blaze – a maximum occupancy of 150. In Volendam, two of the three emergency exits were reportedly blocked on New Year’s Eve.

n Does your jurisdiction have a trained mass casualty plan, covering EMS and other existing medical treatment and transportation resources in your area? Are there SOPs for communication and coordination between distinct units?

n At any given time, does your jurisdiction have the means to quickly locate hospital facilities and their capabilities (including ER and surgery, ICU beds, burn units, trauma centers, other specialized treatment centers like neurosurgery and helipads), even in neighboring states?

In Volendam and all other described dance hall/restaurant calamities, overcrowding and the lack of or blockage of emergency exits were primary contributing factors. It might be up to the local emergency manager to propose the implementation and enforcement of proper fire codes to prevent or mitigate the extent of future fire catastrophes.