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NOT ANOTHER DAY IN L.A.
THE SHOOTING ATTACK AT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER


"Caller:There is somebody shooting, he's got a machine gun.
911 Emergency Operator: What's the address?
Caller: I don't know the address, it's the North Valley Jewish Community Center.
911 Emergency Operator: North Valley…
Caller: On Rinaldi and Hayvenhurst
911 Emergency Operator: O.K., I'll send the police over there.
Caller: Please hurry, he's got a huge machine gun. I don't know how many people are dead and there's tiny children in the summer camp here..
911 Emergency Operator: I'll send the police over there, ma'am, hang on let me put you through to the paramedics. Ma'am hold on for the paramedics o.k., don't hang up. Ma'am hold on for the paramedics o.k., don't hang up."


911 call made from the Jewish Community Center-Aug 10, 1999



Children are led by police out of the North Valley Jewish Community
Center in Granada Hills ( CA ) after a man sprayed the lobby of the
center with gunfire. Quick response by LAPD officers in conjunction with the fire department paramedics resulted in the survival of all victims.


On August 10, 1999 at 10:40 AM a self-proclaimed white supremacist named Buford O. Furrow, Jr. entered the Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills, a quiet suburb in the northern part of Los Angeles. There were about seventy children, ages 5-12, and some staff members in the building at the time. The offender immediately opened fire in the hallway with a machine gun. He shot about seventy rounds and wounded five people. At 10:49 a.m. the frantic calls for help were received at the 9-1-1 center.

Police Activities

Within four minutes the first units of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) arrived on scene.

Sergeant Timothy Surette and Officer Dean Thompson were among the first responders. Outside the building they found a sixteen-year old female bleeding from a gunshot wound.

No one knew the location of the shooter, although some suspected that he might still be in the facility. The patrol officers entered the building with guns drawn, instead of locking up the community center and calling in the SWAT team. Inside they could still smell and see the gunsmoke in the air and see the damaged caused by the bullets. They encountered additional victims.

The initial call "machine gun fire at the Jewish Day Care Center" was so beyond comprehension that the commander of the Devonshire Police Division, Captain John Egan, was immediately put on stand-by. When the first radio messages indicated the magnitude of the event, he rushed to the scene. Arriving there shortly after 11:00 a.m., he assumed command and established his command post inside a church building adjacent to the community center.

Police focused on securing the location, evacuating children and staff to safe places, searching the area for the shooting suspect(s), and gathering intelligence. In addition, the police in the relatively peaceful Devonshire Division had to handle three other nearby major occurrences: the car hijacking of a Toyota at 11:10 a.m., the homicide of postal worker Joe Ileto at 12:00 p.m., and a suspicious van loaded with ammunition, paramilitary equipment and grenades. At this time it was not clear if these crime scenes were related to the same suspect.

Fire Activities:

At 10:50 a.m., the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) initially dispatched Rescue Ambulance #87 and engine#77 to a shooting scene at Hayvenhurst and Rinaldi Street. Within minutes, police requested additional rescue units and the first-in engine, #77, described the scope of the incident. More resources were sent. Within thirty minutes 6 fire companies (2 light forces and 4 engines), 7 rescue ambulances, 1 rescue helicopter, 2 battalion chiefs (#12 and #15) as well as Division-3 Chief Robert Teachenor had arrived on scene.

The fire incident command post was set up outside, near the entrance to the church building. A unified command post with the police was not set up.

Paramedic Todd Carb of LAFD Rescue
Ambulance 87. Carb, along with partner Daniel
Jordan, located Benjamin K., the most seri-
ously injured child and treated and trans-
ported Benjamin to a nearby trauma center.


Rescue

The first fire unit on scene, Rescue Ambulance #87, was staffed with paramedics Todd Carb and Daniel Jordan. Three victims were seen outside the building. As LAPD officers moved in to search the community center, they were followed by LAFD paramedics and firefighters. At this time the location of the shooter was still unknown and the building therefore not safe. Todd Carb, a paramedic veteran with nineteen years experience found 5-year old Benjamin K., suffering from two gunshot wounds, one in his abdomen, one to his upper leg. The boy was in deep haemorrhagic shock due to massive blood loss and was obviously near death. His blood pressure was too low to measure and his collapsed veins were too flat to start an IV. Cutting corners and avoiding time consuming treatment, Paramedic Todd Card and his colleague decided to rush the little boy in their ambulance to nearby Holy Cross Medical Center as fast as possible. The official incident report states that the boy arrived at the trauma center within fifteen minutes after the first ambulance dispatch. Minutes later trauma surgeons began with a six-hour operation to save Benjamin's life.

The crew of LAPD Engine 77,
which was first-in to the Granada Hills shooting scene.


Meanwhile paramedics from engine #77 set up triage, treatment and communication procedures for the other victims. 68 year old Isabelle S. and 16 year old Mindy F. (both staff members), and 6-year old James Z. were found in the entrance area of the building. They were treated and transported in stable condition within thirty minutes. Both females were sent to Holy Cross Emergency Department, and the little boy to a local hospital. 6-year-old Joshua S. was discovered suffering from a gunshot wound, but otherwise in good condition. He was airlifted to Children's Hospital in Hollywood, the only pediatric trauma center in the Los Angeles region.

High Profile Incident

Within minutes news helicopters were over the scene broadcasting in every major U.S. City and in less than two hours the media had responded with a nearly overwhelming number of camera crews, microphones and reporters at the scene.

Fortunately the LAPD as well as the LAFD had their experienced public information officer on hand to deal with the media and gave them facts in a professional manner.

In a very short time the significance of the incident had become obvious. The Mayor, the Police Chief and other city officials showed up at the location ninety minutes after the shooting, received a briefing from Police-IC Captain Egan and gave an on-site press-conference.

This caused additional pressure on the incident staff. They had to make sure that the area was safe and the shooter was not in a nearby hidden place, as well as taking time to brief the executives.

Frantic Parents

Nearly 200 children were dropped off at the community center that morning. Three groups were on field trips at the time of the shooting. Due to the immediate media coverage and the widespread use of cellular phones, many parents showed up desperately looking for their kids. This caused tremendous tension and was a big challenge in the incident handling. First of all, relatives of the victims had to be identified and filtered out of the crowd. In one case the parents of an injured child were escorted and brought to the hospital in a fire vehicle.

L.A.P.D. was in charge of the incident. But they were nearly overwhelmed by the scale of the necessary activities (organizing and communicating resources and assignments, gathering intelligence, etc.), coupled with the three concurrent crime scenes. Therefore the Fire Department assisted them. The parent-child reunification was handled principally by the L.A.F.D., under the supervision of Battalion 12 Chief Tony Varela.

By about 12:30pm, the authorities had informed all the family members of the victims, and all other parents/relatives could be assured that their children were not hurt. It calmed down the crowd a little bit, but there was still a high level of anxiety and uncertainty. This distress was triggered and boosted by countless media and camera crews who were on the lookout for crying and desperate parents.

The LAFD brought in their staff psychologist. He assisted in the critical incident stress debriefing for the parents.

The next step was to identify the location of every child. The kids were on three different field trip spots and at two different places in the incident area. Police units were sent to cover the field trip locations to ensure accountability and prevent further occurrences.

Further investigations proved to identify Furrow as the suspect in the shooting. He later turned himself in to the FBI in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Closure

LA Police officers were honored at a City Council meeting for their actions during the incident; and LA Firefighters were invited to a celebration at the Community Center on August 21st, where they were given a standing ovation from parents, kids and community staff.

Today all five injured people are back home without disabilities and fully recovered from their wounds. As a special sign of support from the LAFD, the last child to be released from the hospital was given a ride home in a fire truck.

Lessons learned



  • Documentation is always a crucial factor. Somebody has to be assigned as soon as possible to gather the names of casualties, their location and their status. The names and actual location of injured victims has to be identified all the times. This is even more critical if children and/or people with disabilities, etc. are involved. This documentation function should be a part of your Standard Operations Plan.

  • Relatives and others effected should be separated from the news media and especially from the pressure of microphones and cameras. A secured and quiet area/facility to comfort and council family members and friends should be assigned as soon as possible.

  • Unified command is always the key to success. Programs should be in place to implement, maintain and train unified command on a regular basis, especially between large police, fire and other public and private entities. Commanding officers must know their colleagues from other departments and understand their organization, views and priorities. This ensures communication, coordination and control of a chaotic incident.

  • Support by public leaders and appreciation by the community is beneficial for public safety personnel. It encourages them to "serve and protect" their community.



Conclusion



First arriving police and fire officers made a consequent decision to make immediate rescue operations a first priority. Their response under chaotic circumstances ensured the survival of five-year old Benjamin K., in extremely critical condition, as well as the quick recovery of four other victims. If any children had died from the white supremacist's shot, it would have caused a enormous impact on the community of Los Angeles and possibly even the U.S. Therefore police and fire responders, through their proactive response, may well have averted a national tragedy.


Aviation Terrorism - Learning from History (published in Crisis Response Journal, December 2004, pages 44-47)









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