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Colossal impact of German train
crash
GUNNAR J KUEPPER describes the cause and reviews the
operational response to a high - speed train crash in
northern Germany on June 3, 1998. The accident, which a
occurred at a speed of 120 mph, resulted in 101
fatalities and nearly 100 injuries, most of them critical.
Until 1994 the German railroad system was organised as a
public transportation department, called Deutsche
Bundesbahn. Today the company is privately owned and is
still the only provider of railway transportation in
Germany. Since 1991 major cities in Germany are connected
by a system of high-speed trains, called ICE-1. ICE
trains had previously transported more than 130 million
passengers, without serious accidents, at top-speeds of
175 mph.
The accident train had, like every ICE-1, two electric
powered locomotives and 12 passenger cars, with
approximately 200 passengers aboard.
About three miles prior to the crash site in Lower Saxony,
a rear wheel of the first passenger car failed and the
wheel rim began to disintegrate. The remainder of the rim
struck against the tracks. Some passengers in the first
car could hear noises and felt vibrations beginning two
minutes before the crash. However, there was no
monitoring system to alert the engineer about the wheel
failure. The debris of the damaged wheel cut an
inductible cable loop (called LZB) three miles prior to
the accident site.
LZB is an automatic train control system overlaid on the
existing signal system. The system continuously
calculates the safe stopping distance for the train and
monitors the traffic ahead.
Two hundred meters before a bridge the train approached a
track switch at a turnout. At this turnout the broken
wheel rim, still hanging on the track brake, collided
with a guide rail. As a result of the impact the rear
left wheels of passenger car number one derailed.
The trailing end of passenger car number 3 hit the
concrete bridge and knocked out the support columns,
causing the 300-ton overpass to collapse. The train was
still running at 50 m/ sec. Cars 3 and 4 passed through
the falling bridge but the middle of car 5 was crushed
and torn apart; the rear end was buried under the 300
tons of concrete debris. Car 6 turned sideways across the
track in front of the barrier. The following six
passenger cars, 7 to 12, and the rear end locomotive, hit
at 120 mph. The unbelievable power pressed everything
together and piled the train up in an accordion fashion.
Cars 6 and 7 were partially buried and crushed by the
bridge debris.
The locomotive had passed without any damage and came to
a rest two miles from the accident site. The stop was
initiated by an automatic emergency braking system - only
then did the engineer realize the situation.
At 11:01 AM fire and police county dispatch received the
first calls reporting a train accident. Fire dispatched
the volunteer fire department of Eschede and the local
EMS Ambulance. Six minutes later, the first units arrived
and county fire dispatcher received the first radio
message describing the magnitude of the ICE-train crash.
Assistance and mutual aid came from local volunteer fire
departments, EMS helicopters, volunteer organizations
like the Red Cross and near by military bases with search
and rescue helicopters. Many volunteer rescue squads
heard about the accident on broadcast or by scanning the
emergency radio channels. They also rushed to the scene;
sometimes with their own agenda.
By 02:00 PM it is estimated that between 800 and 1,000
first responders were at the accident site. At 01:45 PM
all extricated persons were en route to hospitals by
ground ambulances and helicopters. Eighty-seven patients
were distributed to 22 hospitals and trauma centers
within a one hundred miles radius. Emergency physicians
escorted critical patients with life threatening injuries..
During the first four hours the goals were: dispatching
emergency personnel and equipment, search and heavy
rescue operations; extrication of trapped victims; triage-treatment-transport
of the injured; and coordination of responding agencies (190
military personnel with heavy equipment and helicopters,
100 fire vehicles with 500 personnel, 19 EMS helicopter
and 98 ambulances, and at least 40 physicians).
The second phase began the following day and included:
secondary search operations; logistics; body recovery;
dealing with the media; and first press-conference;
replacement of first responders; registration of
fatalities, injured and uninjured train occupants; taking
care of relatives and starting on-site stress debriefings.
The next day phases three and four began, consisting of
body recovery; accident investigation; public relations,
logistics; collection of private baggage; salvage of the
wreckage; and the search for body-parts.
96 people died on initial impact; most bodies needed to
be identified by dental or DNA records.
On the first day there were 1.900 emergency responders
with 400 vehicles; 600 fire personnel from 30 different
departments; 270 EMS personnel with 46 ALS and 42 BLS
ambulances; 370 personnel EMS squads with 88 vehicles; 34
helicopters (19 EMS with ALS equipment, 15 military and
police); 210 military personnel;140 personnel rescue,
salvage and recovery squads (THW) with 16 vehicles; 170
federal/border police personnel with 37 vehicles; and 160
state and local police personnel with 25 vehicles.
County Fire/Rescue Calling and Dispatching Center was
staffed with only one person and in the initial phase,
this person was overwhelmed by the tasks needed to be
done simultaneously. Radio traffic was stuck and cellular
phone networks were overwhelmed in the rural area.
Different agencies (military, public, private and
volunteer ambulances, helicopters) work on distinct radio
channels and it took hours to establish a comprehensive
incident command system, with clear functions and control.
In the initial phase coordination was nearly non-existent.
A proper mobile command post vehicle did not exist in the
county. The county fire chief was not adequately equipped
(no fax, no cellular phone) and the designated personnel
were not experienced to deal with a disaster of this
magnitude. There were no clear identification means of
functions and commanding personnel. ICS is virtually
unknown in Central-Europe and so are functional
identification vests. People with "chief" or
"medical leader" signs could always be seen,
but these persons were neither in charge nor informed.
Due to this, responding units did not receive assignments
and began to work on their own. Other responders were
impotent waiting for assignments to start. Units
experienced with mass casualty incidents, like rescue
helicopter squads and the military, organized themselves.
Operations were also hampered due to the construction of
modern trains: Rescue tools like saws and hydraulic
cutters, slipped on the polished skin of the passenger
cars. Windows were virtually unbreakable, even with
sledgehammers. Rural fire departments had neither the
experience nor the skills needed to deal with modern
train compartments.
In Germany a specific training program for that kind of
incident does not exist and the Railway Company did not
provide any educational material or training courses to
fire and rescue services.
As always, this accident confirmed Murphy's law. If
something has a slight chance of going wrong, it will go
wrong. The smallest town in Montana can be impacted by a
transportation disaster. A High-Speed trains can derail,
as shown here. But a Boeing 747 can also crash into the
elementary school of a township. The only answer to
saving lives and reducing the pain for survivors is
preparedness and a comprehensive emergency management. We
are in charge of making a difference.
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